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Abstract  
On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises 
more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are 
more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among 
several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-
management failures and investment failures can be explained by a common mechanism: an inter-
temporal commitment problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future 
policy choices. Second, it shows that power-sharing institutions are often associated with more 
effective government than power-concentration institutions, in contrast to much of the normative 
literature in comparative politics, in which power-sharing institutions are often justified on other 
grounds, such as representativeness, responsiveness, or social cohesion. In a world where crises 
dominate, power-concentration institutions typically perform better; in a world where investment 
problems dominate, power-sharing institutions do. 


















Governments sometimes confront urgent problems that require them to adopt new policies swiftly 
to avoid harm. At other times, governments confront long-term problems, requiring them to take 
costly actions to increase future welfare. When they deal with the first type of problem, 
governments engage in “crisis management.” When they deal with the second type of problem, 
governments make “political investments.”1  
On the basis of a simple game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments often manage 
crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they 
are more likely to make investments in systems where power is shared more widely. In other words, 
whereas the “majoritarian” vision of democracy is typically associated with more effective crisis 
management, the “proportional” vision is associated with better long-term policies.2 
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we show that both crisis-management failures and 
investment failures can be explained by a common mechanism: an inter-temporal commitment 
problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future policies. Second, we 
show that power-sharing institutions are often associated with more effective government than 
power-concentration institutions, in contrast to much of the normative literature in comparative 
politics, where power-sharing institutions are justified on other grounds, such as 
representativeness, responsiveness, or social cohesion.3 
The most important implication of the paper’s argument is that constitution-making involves a 
crucial trade-off: institutions that enable governments to respond to crises are typically inferior 
when it comes to solving long-term political problems, and vice versa. The optimal constitution is 
therefore context-specific. In a world where crises dominate, power-concentration institutions 
                                               
1 Jacobs (2016, 434–435) defines political investments as “policies that make welfare tradeoffs at the expense of the 
present and in favor of the future,” exchanging “a given amount of short-run welfare” for “greater long-run welfare.” 
2 On the “majoritarian” and “proportional” visions of democracy, see Powell (2000). 






often perform better, but in a world where investment problems dominate, power-sharing 
institutions are superior. The precise nature of this trade-off depends on the other parameters of our 
model, notably the level of political polarization and the magnitude of the policy changes that are 
required to avert a crisis. Interestingly, for some parameter values, power-sharing institutions 
perform better in both worlds. 
 
Crises and Investments 
According to an important literature in political science, governments may become unable to 
respond effectively to changes in the economic, social, and political environment if political power 
is shared among several parties. George Tsebelis (2002, 443) has argued, for instance, that having 
many “veto players” leads to high “policy stability,” making “the change of even an undesirable 
status quo difficult.” According to another important literature, however, concentrating power in a 
single party may itself have pernicious consequences, since the possibility of opportunistic 
behavior by future governments renders governments unwilling to make policy changes that have 
short-term costs. Besley and Persson (2011) argue, for instance, that more inclusive political 
institutions increase the likelihood that governments invest in “state capacity” (the capacity to 
collect revenue and protect property rights). 
Our message is that the first of these ideas is correct when governments confront crises, but the 
second idea is correct when governments deal with long-term political investment problems. 
The main intuition behind the first part of our analysis, which deals with crisis management, is 
that political conflicts in times of crisis are more difficult to resolve in power-sharing systems since 
there is a high likelihood that policies adopted for short-term reasons are “locked in.” The basic 






cannot commit to reversing that policy once the crisis is over, it may be rational for other parties 
to block effective policy adjustments. 
The main intuition behind the second part of our analysis, which deals with political 
investments, is that opportunistic behavior by future governments is less likely in power-sharing 
systems than in power-concentration systems. Like crisis management, investments are associated 
with an inter-temporal commitment problem: if the opposition party or parties cannot commit to 
future policies, the governing party has reason to fear that it will no longer be in a position to reap 
the benefits of the investment when those benefits are realized. Power sharing can be seen as an 
institutional solution to this inter-temporal decision problem, since both present and future power 
tend to be shared more widely in power-sharing systems. 
We are not the first to examine the relationship between political institutions and crisis 
management, nor are we the first to examine the relationship between political institutions and 
investments. For example, our argument about crisis management has a lot in common with the 
theoretical and empirical literatures on fiscal stabilization and financial crises (see especially 
Alesina and Drazen 1991 and MacIntyre 2001) and with the recent literature on policymaking with 
an endogenous status quo (Dziuda and Loeper 2016, 2017).4 Our model of investments, meanwhile, 
has a lot in common with the model of state capacity developed by Besley and Persson (2011), and 
with Alan Jacobs’s analysis of “governing for the long term” (2011). 
But studying government responses to crises and investment problems in a single modeling 
framework, as we do, has several advantages. 
                                               
4 More generally, the idea that “non-majoritarian” democracies tend to be overburdened by “[c]hallenges requiring 
swift response” (Schmidt 2002, 150) has long been debated by comparative politics scholars such as Lijphart (1977, 






Most importantly, we identify a common mechanism in both parts of our model: an inter-
temporal commitment problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future 
policies. That idea distinguishes our argument from related models. The ineffectiveness of power-
sharing when governments face crises is often explained with reference to the high transaction 
costs that come with political bargaining.5 We get to a similar conclusion without making any 
assumptions about political transaction costs, which are notoriously hard to quantify.6 Meanwhile, 
the future-orientedness of governments in power-sharing democracies is often explained with 
reference to their capacity for deliberation and the exercise of reasoned and considered judgment 
(see especially Lijphart 2012). We get to a similar conclusion without making any assumptions 
about policymaking styles. 
Moreover, studying government responses to crises and investment problems within a single 
modeling framework leads to a more balanced assessment of the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of power-sharing institutions. For reasons that will become clear later on, we caution 
against any across-the-board negative or positive assessments of particular institutions, for in our 
model, the net effect of institutions depends on whether countries are more likely to experience 
crises or investment problems, on political polarization, and on the magnitude of the policy changes 
that are needed to avert crises. 
Some scholars have highlighted the difficulty of committing to future policies and others have 
emphasized the drawbacks of policy rigidity, but few scholars have integrated both aspects of 
policymaking in a single model. One prominent exception is Tommasi, Scartascini, and Stein 
(2014), which investigates “stability” and “adaptability” in a repeated-games framework. They 
                                               
5 For example, Schmidt (2002) attributes the greater effectiveness of majoritarian democracies to the “rapid 
development of political alternatives and rapid decision making.” 






show that in an inter-temporal model, having more veto players lead to more stability, but also to 
more adaptability.7 The argument is that more veto players today means more veto players in the 
future, changing the expectations of political agents and sustaining cooperative equilibria over 
time. Our model differs from the Tommasi, Scartascini, and Stein model in two important respects. 
First of all, our approach does not rely on cooperation enforced by repeated interaction; second, we 
are interested in two different types of policy changes – crisis-management and investments – and 
not primarily in the trade-off between stability and change.8  
 
The Model 
Consider a society that is made up of two groups of citizens. Each group is represented by a political 
party, denoted J = A, B, which acts in the interest of the members of the group. 
The government sets a single policy, which is defined by the parameter 𝜋 ∈ [0, 1]. The benefits 
that citizens, and indirectly therefore also parties, derive from this policy depends on two factors: 
the distance between the policy that is adopted by the government and their own ideal policy, 𝜋(∗, 
and the policy’s “quality,” which is defined by the parameter 𝜔. Parties may disagree on the level 
                                               
7 For a related argument about how another important aspect of policy-making – lobbying costs – vary with the 
number of veto players, see Gehlbach and Malesky (2010). 
8 Our argument is also closely related to the literature on how commitment problems and uncertainty about the future 
lead to the “inefficient use of power” (Powell 2004). In this family of models, sub-optimal political decisions such as 
bureaucratic insulation (de Figueiredo Jr. 2002), coups (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001), wars (Fearon 1995), 
and civil wars (Fearon 2004), are interpreted as actions that insure against the possibility of a future decline in power. 
There are precursors to our argument that these sorts of effects are more pronounced the more power is concentrated. 
For example, sharing power more widely through democratization has been shown to mitigate the negative effects of 
large shifts in relative power (Ghosal and Proto 2009), and in a democratic context, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) 
explore a two-party model in which the party in power uses the level of debt strategically to influence the choices of 
the next government (the level of debt becoming inefficiently high when polarization is high and the probability of 
re-election is low). Moreover, our paper is related to recent analyses of dynamic policymaking with an endogenous 
status quo, in which uncertainty over the preferences of future governments affects the decisions that parties or 
legislators make today. For example, in Buisseret and Bernhardt (2017), the expectation of future gridlock makes 
players use their power to maximum effect today, whereas the expectation of a better possible deal in the future 
makes them wait. Similarly, in Dziuda and Loeper (2016), a player takes more extreme positions in the short-run as a 






of 𝜋, but they all have an interest in keeping policy quality high. For example, whereas parties 
typically have different preferences over the level of public-goods provision, they have a shared 
interest in public goods being provided as efficiently as possible.9 
To keep things simple, we examine a two-period model and we assume that the utility citizens 
represented by party J derive from government policy in period 𝑡 = 1, 2 is defined by 
𝑈(,/ = 01 − 2𝜋/ − 𝜋(∗3
45𝜔/, 
where 𝜋(∗ is party J’s ideal policy and 𝜔/ is the quality of the policy in period 𝑡. The intuition behind 
this functional form is simple. If 𝜋/ = 𝜋(∗ (that is, if party J’s ideal policy is implemented in period 
𝑡), group J’s utility attains its maximum value, 𝜔/. If, on the other hand, J would prefer a policy 
that is the complete opposite of the policy that is adopted by the government, J’s utility is 0. 
Between these two extreme values, J’s utility decreases at an increasing rate as the distance 
between J’s ideal policy and the actual policy increases. Note that although J cares relatively more 
about policy quality if it approves of the government’s policy for ideological reasons, the policy’s 
quality only ceases to matter entirely to J if J is completely opposed to the policy adopted by the 
government. 
                                               
9 For one example of what 𝜋 and 𝜔 might mean in practice, consider the following scenario. Assume that citizens, 
and indirectly therefore also parties, derive utility from two public goods, 𝑔8  and 𝑔9, but have different preferences 
over those goods, in the sense that some citizens would like to devote more resources to one good than to the other, 
and vice versa. The parameter 𝜋 might then describe the proportion of the government’s resources that is devoted to 
𝑔8 (the proportion 1 − 𝜋, consequently, being devoted to 𝑔9). In this scenario, the quality parameter 𝜔 can be used 
to describe the total volume of resources available for spending on  𝑔8  and 𝑔9, or, alternatively, the efficiency of the 
delivery of 𝑔8  and 𝑔9 (so that a higher level of 𝜔 enhances the welfare effect of a given level of spending on 𝑔8  and 
𝑔9). But 𝜋 and 𝜔 can also be interpreted differently, as we discuss in Section 6 – the general idea is that it is possible 
to distinguish between elements of public policy that different groups disagree on (𝜋) and elements of public policy 






Without loss of generality, we assume that 𝜋:∗ ≥ 𝜋<∗ : what distinguishes group A from group B 
is that A wants just as much or more of 𝜋. It is helpful to define the parameter 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1]	as the 
distance between party A’s and party B’s ideal policies, so that 
𝛼 = 𝜋:∗ − 𝜋<∗ . 
We can think of 𝛼 as a measure of political polarization. If 𝛼 = 0, A and B have identical 
preferences. If, by contrast, 𝛼 = 1, their preferences are diametrically opposed. Note that the utility 
that members of group J derive from the implementation of the other group’s ideal policy is 
(1 − 𝛼4)𝜔/. 
 
Political Institutions 
In each period, either A, B, or a coalition of the two controls the government. We assume that under 
power-concentration institutions, all governments are single-party governments (either A or B 
governs), but under power-sharing institutions, all governments are coalitions (A and B govern 
together, with one of them, the agenda setter, having the power to propose policies that the other 
party must either accept or reject). Under power-concentration institutions, then, the party in power 
sets policy unilaterally in each period; under power-sharing institutions, all policy changes, relative 
to the status-quo policy 𝜋/AB, require unanimity. 
We assume that the status-quo policy in place in the beginning of period 1, denoted	𝜋C, is the 




(𝜋:∗ + 𝜋<∗ ). 






We also assume that under both power-concentration and power-sharing institutions, the 
probability of political turnover is B
4
. With probability B
4
, the	group	that controls the government 
(under power-concentrating institutions) or acts as agenda setter (under power-sharing institutions) 
in period 1 remains in the same position in period 2. Otherwise the other party takes over. This 
assumption simplifies the exposition greatly, and allowing the rate of political turnover to vary 
would not change the main message of the paper. 10  
 
Modeling Crises and Investments 
The main distinction between “crisis management” and “political investments,” in our model, is 
that a crisis requires governments to adjust public policies temporarily to changing circumstances 
to avoid harm, whereas an investment requires governments to forgo some welfare now in the 
expectation that welfare will be higher in the future. 
Our analysis of crisis management is thus concerned with how governments adjust policies to 
sudden, adverse events. Specifically, we model a crisis as an event that threatens to reduce 
permanently the quality of government policy by ℎ ∈ (0, 1] 	(ℎ	for “harm”). In other words, unless 
the government in period 1 acts to avert the crisis, 𝜔4 = 𝜔B = (1 − ℎ)𝜔C. The action that the go-
vernment can take to avert the crisis is to adopt a policy in period 1 that is equal to or greater than 
the critical value 𝜋N. The assumption is that circumstances in period 1 require some minimal level 
of 𝜋 – perhaps because a looming banking crisis requires a higher level of financial regulation or 
                                               
10 It is possible to generalize the model by allowing the probability of turnover to vary. Allowing the probability of 
turnover to be very low would make investments more likely in power-concentration systems (at least for certain 
values of the parameter 𝛼). A high probability of turnover would have the opposite effect. For most democracies, 
however, a turnover probability of  B
4
	 is a reasonable approximation of the mean rate over time. We have therefore 






because an impending economic crisis begins in a sector of the economy that benefits from a high 
level of 𝜋. Note that we are modeling a particular type of crisis, in that successfully averting the 
crisis has an asymmetric distributional impact (a crisis that could be averted by equal sacrifices by 
both players would typically be averted immediately). 
In our analysis of political investments, we assume that there is an opportunity to forgo some 
welfare in period 1, temporarily lowering the quality of public policies in that period by 𝜄, with the 
aim of increasing the quality of public policies, and therefore welfare, to (1 + 𝑦)𝜔B	in period 2. 
We assume that 𝜄, the cost of making such an investment, is greater than 0 and lesser than 𝑦 (in 
other words, we are only modeling investments that in fact lead to a net increase in the quality of 
public policies over both periods). 
 
Order of Moves 
Since none of our results depend on the value of 𝜔C, we normalize 𝜔C	to 1. 
The order of moves is the following: 
(1) Party J adopts (under power-concentration institutions) or proposes (under power-shar-
ing institutions) a policy. The first-period policy vector is {𝜋B} in our analysis of crisis 
management and {𝜋B, 𝜄} in our analysis of political investments. Under power-sharing 
institutions, the other party either accepts or rejects J’s proposal. If the proposal is 
rejected, the status quo policy remains in force (𝜋B = 𝜋C and no investment is made). 
(2) In the crisis-management part of the model, if 𝜋B ≥ 𝜋N, the quality of public policy 
remains constant in t1 and t2 (𝜔4 = 𝜔B = 𝜔C = 1), otherwise the quality declines to 1 −
ℎ	in both periods due to the unchecked crisis (the crisis can only be averted in period 






quality of public policy in period 1 to 1 − 𝜄, whereas the quality in period 2 increases to 
1 + 𝑦. 
(3) With probability B
4
	, party J holds on to power (or remains agenda setter) in period 2; 
with probability	B
4
	, the other party wins power (or becomes agenda setter). 
(4) The party that is in power (or acts as agenda setter) in period 2 adopts (under power-
concentration institutions) or proposes (under power-sharing institutions) a policy 𝜋4. 
Under power-sharing institutions, the other party either accepts or rejects the first 




We begin our analysis with the case of crisis management in power-concentration systems. 
 
Power Concentration 
Our main objective is to describe the circumstances in which the party in power in period 1, J, 
chooses to avert a crisis. 
If 𝜋(∗ ≥ 𝜋N, J’s choice in period 1 is simple: whether there is a crisis or not, J’s ideal policy is to 
set 𝜋B at level that is sufficiently high to avert a crisis. There is consequently no trade-off between 
averting a crisis and pursuing other political goals. 
If 𝜋(∗ < 𝜋N, however, J needs to choose between setting 𝜋B	to a higher level than J would ideally 
want (in the interest of averting the crisis) or ignoring the crisis and adopting its own ideal policy, 






choice is to avert the crisis if the harm done by the crisis, ℎ, is greater than or equal to the critical 




4 − 𝛼4 . 
This critical value has an intuitive interpretation: J is willing to take measures against a crisis if the 
difference between 𝜋N and 𝜋(∗ is low and if 𝛼 is low. In other words, J is willing to respond to a 
crisis if averting the crisis does not require policy measures that J is strongly opposed to and if 
distributional conflicts are low.  
 
Power Sharing 
We now turn to the case of crisis management in power-sharing systems. In power-concentration 
systems, as we have just seen, the party in power in period 1 worries about period 2 since the party 
in power in period 2 is always able to set its ideal policy. In power-sharing systems, by contrast, 
the parties in period 1 worry about period 2 since the policy adopted in period 1 is also period 2’s 
status quo policy, which makes it possible for that policy to become “locked in.” Specifically, any 
policy 𝜋B that satisfies 
𝜋:∗ ≥ 𝜋B ≥ 𝜋<∗  
will stand in period 2. Moreover, even if 𝜋N > 𝜋:∗ , so that A will always want to lower 𝜋 in period 
2, B’s bargaining position will be relatively weak since A will only accept policy changes that 
satisfy 






If  𝜋C ≥ 𝜋N, policy choices in period 1 are straightforward: since the status-quo policy is 
sufficient to avert an economic crisis, the status-quo policy always stands (and crises are always 
averted). 
If 𝜋C < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋:∗ , the strategic situation is more interesting. B knows that if 𝜋B is set to 𝜋N, that 
policy will always stand in period 2 (since 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋:∗). This means that a crisis will only be averted 
if B expects to be harmed more by the crisis than by raising 𝜋 from 𝜋C to 𝜋N in both periods – or, 
in other words, if h exceeds the critical value ℎRXB∗ , which is defined by 
ℎRXB∗ =
4(𝜋N − 𝜋<∗ )4 − 𝛼4
4 − 𝛼4 . 
This condition holds regardless of whether A or B is the agenda setter in period 1 (B, having the 
most to lose, is the pivotal decision-maker). But the identity of the agenda setter matters for the 
exact level of 𝜋B and 𝜋4 if the crisis is averted. If B is the agenda setter and h exceeds the critical 
value ℎRXB∗ , B will propose 𝜋B = 𝜋N and A will accept. If A is the agenda setter, on the other hand, 
A is typically able to increase 𝜋 to an even higher level than 𝜋N, since A can propose setting 𝜋 to a 
level that makes B indifferent between averting and not averting the crisis.  
The expression on the right-hand side of equation (2) has some interesting properties. As in the 
power-concentration case (see equation 1), the crucial decision maker in the government, B, is 
willing to take measures against a crisis if the difference between 𝜋N and 𝜋<∗  is low. But in this 
particular scenario, 𝛼, our measure of political polarization, is negatively related with ℎRXB∗ . In other 
words, political polarization now makes it more likely that crises are averted. But note that this 
scenario, in which 𝜋C < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋:∗ , is more likely to occur when polarization, as defined by 𝛼, is 
already high.11 
                                               






If	𝜋:∗ < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋:∗ + 	𝛼, the strategic situation is more interesting still. B knows that if 𝜋B is set to 
𝜋N, A, like B, will want to lower 𝜋	when the two groups bargain over policy in period 2, but A will 
nevertheless be at an advantage, for if A becomes the agenda setter in period 2, A will be able to 
set its own ideal policy, and if B becomes the agenda setter, it will not be able to propose a policy 
that is lower than 2𝜋:∗ − 𝜋N (since A will only accept if the distance between the policy proposal 
and A’s ideal policy is lesser than or equal to the distance between A’s ideal policy and 𝜋N). 
This means that the crisis will only be averted if ℎ exceeds the critical value ℎRX4∗ , which is 
defined by 
ℎRX4∗ =
3𝛼4 + 2𝛼(𝜋N − 𝜋:∗ ) + 3(𝜋N − 𝜋:∗)4
4 − 𝛼4 . 
This critical value too has a natural interpretation. B is more likely to accept a policy that reverses 
the crisis if 𝛼 is low (that is, if distributional conflicts are not too severe), and if the distance 
between 𝜋:∗	and 𝜋N is small (the measures required to avert the crisis are not too extreme). 
If	𝜋N > 𝜋:∗  + 𝛼, finally, the measures that are required to avert the crisis are so drastic that both 
parties prefer the other party’s ideal policy to 𝜋N in period 2. This means that the critical value of 
h is  
ℎRXZ	∗ =
2(𝜋N − 𝜋<∗ )4
4 − 𝛼4 , 
which, interestingly, is identical to ℎRS	∗ when B is in power. There is a natural explanation, however: 
if B wins power in period 2, B can adopt its ideal policy, just as in a power-concentration system. 
As before, B is more likely to support effective crisis-management measures if 𝜋N and 𝛼 are low 














(implying that the measures required to avert the crisis are not too extreme and distributional 
conflicts are not severe). 
 
Equilibrium in the Crisis Game 
Table 1 lists the lower bound for how serious a crisis needs to become for the government to act to 
avert it in the different versions of our model (the equilibrium behavior of the two parties in all 
these scenarios is described in full in the Appendix).  
 
Table 1. When Are Crises Averted? 
 Power Concentration Power Sharing 
Govt./agenda setter: A B A B 
𝜋N ≤ 𝜋<∗  Always Always Always Always 
𝜋<∗ < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋C Always ℎ ≥ ℎRS,<∗  Always Always 
𝜋C < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋:∗ Always ℎ ≥ ℎRS,<∗  ℎ ≥ ℎRXB∗  ℎ ≥ ℎRXB∗  
𝜋:∗ < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋:∗ + 	𝛼 ℎ ≥ ℎRS,:∗  ℎ ≥ ℎRS,<∗  ℎ ≥ ℎRX4∗  ℎ ≥ ℎRX4∗  
𝜋N > 𝜋:∗ + 𝛼 ℎ ≥ ℎRS,:∗  ℎ ≥ ℎRS,<∗  ℎ ≥ ℎRXZ∗ = 	ℎRS,<∗  ℎ ≥ ℎRXZ∗ = ℎRS,<∗  
Comment: The critical values ℎ∗ are defined in the text. 
 
On the basis of this table, we can make a direct comparison between power-concentration and 
power-sharing institutions.  
In the special case when 𝜋<∗ < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋C, power-sharing systems are superior to power-
concentrating systems, from a crisis-management perspective, since B sometimes has an incentive 






power-sharing systems actually works to their advantage, for the status-quo policy 𝜋C is sufficient 
to avert the crisis.12 
When more drastic measures are required to avert the crisis, however, power-concentration 
systems are often superior. 
Consider first the case where 𝜋C < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋:∗ . In these circumstances, a crisis is always averted 
when A governs alone, but not always when A is the agenda setter in a power-sharing system. When 
B is more powerful – governing alone in a power-concentration system or acting as agenda setter 
in a power-sharing system – the findings are more mixed, but even now power-concentration 
systems are superior to power-sharing systems, from a crisis-aversion perspective, when the critical 
value ℎRXB∗  is greater than the critical value ℎRS,<∗ . By rearranging and simplifying, we find that this 
is the case when 
𝛼 < 	√2(𝜋N − 𝜋<∗ ). 
This suggests that power-concentration systems outperform power-sharing systems when averting 
the crisis requires more drastic actions (setting 𝜋N to a high level, bringing it closer to A’s ideal 
point than B’s). In other words, although governments in power-sharing systems are likely to avert 
crises that only require small policy adjustments, governments in power-concentrating systems are 
always more likely to respond to crises that require larger policy adjustments. 
If 𝜋:∗ + 𝛼	 ≥ 𝜋N > 𝜋:, the crisis is averted under power-concentration if ℎ > ℎRS∗  and under 
power sharing if ℎ > ℎRX4∗ . To see whether power-concentration or power-sharing is associated 
with superior crisis management, we therefore need to compare the critical values ℎRS∗  and ℎRX4∗ , 
                                               
12 A “crisis” that can be solved by doing nothing (maintaining the status quo) is hardly severe. Nevertheless, it is an 
important feature of our model that “small” (in terms of what is required to avert it) crises turn out to be handled 






and since, even if B is in power (which is the critical case), it is always true that ℎRS,<∗ < ℎRX4∗ , 
power-concentration is associated with superior crisis management when 𝜋N is in this range.13  
When 	𝜋N > 𝜋:∗ + 𝛼, finally, the crisis is averted under power-concentration if ℎ > ℎRS∗  and 
under power sharing if ℎ > ℎRXZ∗ , keeping in mind that ℎRXZ∗ = ℎRS,<∗ . It is easy to see that power-
concentration institutions are slightly more likely than power-sharing institutions to avert crises in 
this scenario, since the critical value ℎRS,:∗  is lower than the critical value ℎRS,<∗  as long as A and B 
have different policy preferences. 
In general, therefore, power-concentration systems outperform power-sharing systems when it 
comes to averting crises when averting the crisis requires a relatively large shift in policy; but it is 
interesting to note that when it comes to crises that only require small policy adjustments, power-
sharing institutions are sometimes superior. 
 
Investments 
We now proceed to the analysis of investments. As we noted in the introduction, we follow Alan 
Jacobs (2011, 3–4) in defining political investments as “policies that make welfare tradeoffs at the 
expense of the present and in favor of the future.” Such a policy “translates a given amount of 
short-run welfare into greater long-run welfare.” In other words, the total net welfare over all 
periods is greater if an investment is made than if it is not. As we discussed in Section 1, the main 
reason that investments are not always made is uncertainty over future policy. 
 
Power Concentration 
                                               
13 To see why this is the case, note that ℎRS∗ < ℎRX4∗ 	simplifies to 
𝛼 + 𝜋:∗ − 𝜋N > 0, 






As before, in a power-concentration system, only one party, J, controls the government. In period 
1, J decides unilaterally whether to invest and sets 𝜋B. If an investment is made, policy quality in 
period 1 decreases to 1 − 𝜄, but policy quality in period 2 increase to 1 + 𝑦	(as before, we assume 
that 𝜔C = 1).14 With probability 
B
4
	, the party in power in period 1 stays in power in period 2; with 
probability B
4
	, power shifts to the other party. The party in power in period 2 then sets 𝜋4. 
Since the game ends after period 2, the optimal decision for the party that controls the 
government in period 2 is always to set its ideal policy. Comparing J’s expected utility of investing 
with J’s expected utility of not investing, we therefore find that in equilibrium, J’s optimal choice 
is to make the investment if 
𝑦 ≥
2𝜄
2 − 𝛼4. 
Let the right hand-side of this equation define the critical value 𝑦RS∗ , which is how much an invest-
ment needs to increase policy quality in period 2 for a government in a power-concentration system 
to undertake it. Whether party J, in government in period 1, makes the investment is thus a function 
of 𝛼, 𝜄, and 𝑦. Rather intuitively, investments are more likely if distributional conflicts are not 
divisive, if it is not too costly to make investments, and if the gains of investments are large. 
 
Power Sharing 
Under power-sharing institutions, unanimity is required to adopt new policies. The agenda setter 
makes a proposal— {𝜋B, 𝜄} in period 1 and {𝜋4} in period 2—and the other party either accepts or 
                                               
14 We can think of this as the cost of the investment leading to fewer resources available to keep current quality 






rejects. As before, if the proposition is rejected, the policy 𝜋/AB remains in place, and no investment 
is made. 
In equilibrium, the investment is always made, since the agenda setter can always propose a 
policy that includes investments and that makes the other party at least as well off, over two periods, 
as the status-quo policy. If A is agenda setter in period 1, A proposes making the investment and 
setting 𝜋B to a level that is higher than 𝜋C but nevertheless makes B indifferent between accepting 
and rejecting A's proposal. Similarly, if B is the agenda setter, B proposes making the investment 
and setting 𝜋B to a level that is lower than 𝜋C. 
To see why, consider the case where A is agenda-setter. A's best strategy is to propose to invest 
and to propose a policy 𝜋Bj ≥ 𝜋C. B accepts if the expected utility associated with A’s proposal is 
higher than its expected utility of status quo policy (𝜋C), knowing that 𝜋Bj  will remain in force in 
period 2. Consider this expression, which defines, implicitly, the value of 𝜋Bj 	 that A can propose 
and that B will accept: 
1 − (𝜋Bj − 𝜋<∗ )4 =
2(1 − (𝜋C − 𝜋<∗ )4)
2 + 𝑦 − 𝜄 . 
Since 𝑦 > 𝜄, A is able to set a higher 𝜋 than the status quo, and B will still accept. 
The net value of the political investment thus determines the distance between 𝜋C and the policy 
that the agenda setter can propose in period 1. To put it differently, the agenda setter can use its 
agenda-setting power to pay less than an equal share of the cost of the investment in period 1 and 
to get a relatively larger share of the gains in period 2. The reason is that both A and B prefer a 
smaller share of a larger pie if that share is larger – in absolute terms – than a relatively larger share 







Equilibrium in the Investment Game 
Under power-concentration institutions, the government always sets its ideal policy 𝜋(∗ in both 
periods. In period 1, the government makes the investment if 𝑦 ≥ 𝑦RS∗ ; otherwise the government 
does not make the investment. 
Under power-sharing institutions, the investment is always made. The agenda-setter in period 1 
proposes a policy that makes the other party indifferent between accepting the proposal and 
rejecting the proposal, and the other group accepts. The policy adopted in period 1 always stands 
in period 2. 
In sum, power-sharing institutions are superior in the investment game, since the investment is 
made regardless of the level of distributive conflict and regardless of the level of political 
uncertainty. Whether investments are made under power-concentration institutions depends on the 
level of distributional conflict and on the surplus generated by the investment. 
 
The Optimal Constitution 
So far, we have shown that governments in power-concentration systems typically handle crises 
more effectively than governments in power-sharing systems, especially if the crises can only be 
averted through major changes in policy, whereas governments in power-sharing systems are more 
likely to make political investments. This suggests that the optimal constitution, from the 
perspective of effective government, varies depending on the external context. Power-
concentration systems are more likely to be superior in environments in which crises are common, 
whereas power-sharing systems are more likely to be superior in environments in which 






In the model that we have developed, equilibrium behavior by governments depends on several 
different parameters. In this section, we fix some of the model parameters in order to illustrate the 
combined effects of three factors: the likelihood of crises relative to the likelihood of investment 
opportunities, the level of political polarization, and the magnitude of policy changes that are 
required to avert crises. 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that A's and B's preferences are inversely related, so that 
𝜋<∗ = 1 −	𝜋:∗. We also assume that the cost of making an investment, 𝜄, represents a 20 percent 
reduction of the quality of policies in period 1 (a considerable sacrifice).15 The critical values for 
the harm from a crisis, ℎ, and the value of investments, 𝑦, are determined endogenously using the 
equations that we derived in the last few sections.16 
In the four subfigures of Figure 1, the x-axis represents the likelihood of a crisis, relative to the 
likelihood that the government is able to invest in future welfare, whereas the y-axis represents the 
difference between A's and B's political preferences (𝛼).17 The four subfigures themselves 
represent different levels of 𝜋N, or, in other words, crises that are increasingly difficult to avert. 
Red areas represent combinations of parameter values for which the aggregate losses associated 
with power-sharing institutions over both periods of the game are greater than the aggregate losses 
associated with power-concentration institutions over both periods. Blue areas represent situations 
                                               
15 Different combinations of values on these parameters generate different patterns. One result that is constant across 
specifications, however, is that power-concentration systems are only ever superior to power-sharing systems if the 
likelihood of a crisis is high. 
16 Our calculations regarding the relative performance of power-concentration and power-sharing systems are based 
on these critical values for ℎ	and 𝑦. In other words, the results that we report concern limiting cases: the maximal 
harm that an unaverted crisis can cause and the maximal opportunity cost of investments that were not made. An 
alternative approach would have been to run simulations in which the values of ℎ and 𝑦 are drawn from some 
underlying distribution. However, the conclusions of such simulations would have been substantively similar. 
17 The figure is based on the assumption that as long as there is no crisis, it is possible to invest in future welfare. But 
the results generalize straightforwardly to an environment in which there are sometimes neither crises nor investment 







in which power-concentration institutions are associated with greater aggregate losses than power-
sharing systems. 
As the figure shows, the virtues of power-concentration institutions are most apparent when a 
major policy shift is required to avert crises (𝜋N is high) and when both the likelihood of crises and 
the level of distributional conflict (𝛼) are high. For other combinations of parameter values – when 
only modest policy shifts are required to avert crises, when the risk of crises is low, or when 








Figure 1: The Effects of Institutions. Blue areas represent circumstances in which power-sharing institutions are 
associated with smaller aggregate losses of policy quality than power-concentration systems, whereas red areas 
represent circumstances in which power-concentration institutions are associated with smaller aggregate losses of 
policy quality than power-sharing systems. 
 
Empirical Illustrations 
In the first part of the theoretical analysis, we concentrated on crises, which are situations in which 
the main challenge for the government is to come up with a quick, resolute policy response to a 






superior, since crises are averted for a broader range of parameter values in power-concentration 
systems than in power-sharing systems (at least crises that require a major policy adjustment); 
power-sharing systems are more sensitive to distributional conflicts. 
Consider a country that is faced with a financial crisis. Our model – with its distinction between 
the elements of public policy that different groups disagree on (𝜋) and the public policy objectives 
that they agree on (𝜔) – can be applied straightforwardly to such events. For example, it is easy to 
imagine that although political parties may agree that the regulation of the financial sector should 
be of high quality (𝜔), they may simultaneously disagree on how much the sector should be 
regulated (𝜋).18 In a financial crisis, moreover, all parties may prefer a temporarily higher level of 
regulation, as compared to normal times. Even parties that favor light-touch regulation may agree 
that raising the level of regulation from the status quo level 𝜋C to a new level 𝜋N is justified. But 
parties that favor light-tough regulation will be more reluctant to agree to such policy adjustments 
if they are concerned that the higher level of regulation will be “locked in” after the crisis, which 
is a risk they face in power-sharing systems.  
This is a plausible explanation for the common empirical finding that power-sharing systems 
do not counter financial crises as effectively as power-concentration systems. Successful responses 
to financial crises depend in part on rapid political responses, and the empirical literature on 
financial crises suggests that in this respect, power-sharing institutions are at a disadvantage (as 
Alesina and Drazen 1991 and Cox and McCubbins 2001 also argue). Recent research into the 
political determinants of responses to economic crises shows, for instance, that power sharing 
impedes effective policy response to both financial crises (O'Keeffe and Tierzi 2015) and banking 
crises (MacIntyre 2001, Satyanath 2005). Countries with power-sharing institutions also seem to 
                                               






react more slowly to fiscal shocks, and therefore generate unsustainable fiscal deficits more quickly 
(Howitt and Wintrobe 1995, Spolaore 2004). The same logic applies to currency crises. For 
example, Han (2009) argues, building on Eichengreen and Rose (2001), that swift action is key for 
a successful defense of a currency peg, and finds that developed countries with a high number of 
veto players more often fail to defend their currencies than countries in which power is 
concentrated. Systems with multiple veto players seem to “have difficulty in responding to 
environmental changes that demand prompt and consistent actions, such as speculative attacks” 
(Han 2009, 730).19 
The second part of our analysis was concerned with political investments. One important 
category of political investments is investments in fiscal capacity (see, for example, Besley and 
Persson 2011, Chapter 2). Fiscal capacity is commonly increased by adding to, reforming, or in 
other ways changing the tax system. Such reforms are costly. For example, introducing a new tax, 
such as a tax on income or a Value Added Tax (VAT), requires considerable investments in 
administrative capacity (Riezman and Slemrod 1987), which matters to politicians with short time 
horizons even if the investments have large long-term benefits (in the case of the VAT, Keen and 
Lockwood 2010 argue that the implementation of the VAT required extensive modernization of 
the tax administration, but led to a more efficient tax system in the long term). 
Our model applies to these sorts of political situations as well. Although political parties differ 
with respect to their preferences over the overall level of taxation, they all benefit from having a 
more efficient tax system.20 But distributional conflicts influence their decisions. When 
                                               
19 Ha and Kang (2015) examine policy responses to financial crises in developing countries. They find no effect of a 
crisis on the direction of economic policy in systems with many veto players, indicating a failure to respond to 
shocks that impeded economic recovery. 
20 Changing or keeping tax rates can also be a strategic response to business cycle shocks or debt crises (see for 






governments decide whether to introduce new taxes, increase the levels of existing taxes, or invest 
in tax administration, they typically do so because they wish to spend the money on specific 
programs in the future. Uncertainty about future spending priorities therefore matters greatly for 
the choices that governments make. This uncertainty has been cited as the explanation for why the 
United States still has no federal broad-based consumption tax (Steinmo 1993), which makes the 
United States different from other advanced democracies. Our analysis suggests that an investment 
in a new tax – or in improved tax administration – is more likely to happen in countries where 
power is shared among several parties than in countries where power is concentrated, since power 
sharing makes the spending priorities of future governments more predictable. This arguably 
explains why broad-based VAT taxes were first introduced in proportional democracies such as 
Denmark in 1967, Germany and Uruguay in 1968, and the Netherlands and Sweden in 1969.21 
 
Conclusion 
Our argument is highly stylized. For example, the game-theoretic model has a finite number of 
time periods. In infinite-horizon repeated games, inter-temporal cooperation is sometimes made 
possible by trigger strategies, which means that power-concentration systems might perform 
relatively better if the model were extended to infinite time. In our view, however, an infinite-
horizon formulation would have important drawbacks. It is unlikely that political agents in the real 
world look toward the infinite future, and they are certainly not sure to play the same opponents in 
                                               
21 An exception is semi-majoritarian France, which introduced the VAT already in 1968 (Carter 2013). Another 
example of policymaking for the long term is pension reform. The long-term sustainability of pension systems 
depends on present investments, which are financed by taxes or social-insurance contributions. Jacobs (2011) finds 
that the decision whether to invest in a reformed pension system depends on the risk that future government will use 
those funds for other purposes. Our theoretical analysis suggests that this risk is what sometimes renders 






infinity. Moreover, trigger strategies that are based on the threat of eternal non-cooperation are 
often not politically credible. 
Another simplification in our model is the absence of so-called sunset provisions: policies with 
a well-defined end date. If a policy response to a crisis can be designed in such a way that it is not 
permanent, the commitment problem that political agents face in power-sharing systems in our 
model can be avoided. We believe that the simplification we have made is justifiable, however. 
Sunset provisions are rare – on the United States, see Dziuda and Loeper 2016, 1171, and the works 
cited there – and a policy change that is intended to be temporary can easily become permanent if 
a new constituency forms that is in favor of the new policy. Removing a benefit, once introduced, 
is typically unpopular. 
There are strong reasons to believe, therefore, that whereas power-concentration institutions are 
typically associated with superior crisis management, at least when major policy adjustments are 
required to avert crises, power-sharing institutions are associated with a higher likelihood that 
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Appendix: Equilibrium in the Crisis Game 
(i) If 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋<∗ , a crisis is always averted. Under power-concentration institutions, the party that is 
in power in period 1 adopts its ideal policy 𝜋(∗ (which is sufficient to avert the crisis); then the party 
that is in power in period 2 adopts its ideal policy. Under power-sharing institutions, the status quo 
policy 𝜋C remains in force in both period 1 and period 2 and is sufficient to avert the crisis. 
(ii) If 𝜋<∗ < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋C, the crisis is always averted, with one exception: power-concentration 
systems in which B is in government and B has an incentive to adopt its ideal policy rather than 
averting the crisis. Under power-concentration institutions, A, if in government, adopts its ideal 
policy 𝜋:∗ , which is sufficient to avert the crisis, whereas B, if in government, only adopts the policy 
𝜋N if ℎ ≥ ℎRS∗ , otherwise B adopts its ideal policy 𝜋<∗ ; then the group that is in power in period 2 
adopts its ideal policy. Under power-sharing institutions, the status quo policy 𝜋C remains in force 
in both period 1 and period 2 and is sufficient to avert the crisis. 
(iii) If 𝜋C < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋:∗ , we need to consider several scenarios. Under power-concentration 
institutions, A, if in government, adopts its ideal policy 𝜋:∗  (which is sufficient to avert the crisis), 
whereas B, if in government, adopts the policy 𝜋N if ℎ ≥ ℎRS∗ , otherwise B adopts its ideal policy 
𝜋<∗  and the crisis is not averted; then the party that is in power in period 2 adopts its ideal policy. 
Under power-sharing institutions, the status quo policy 𝜋C remains in force in both period 1 and 
period 2 (and the crisis is not averted) if ℎ < ℎRXB∗ ; if ℎ ≥ ℎRXB∗ , A, if agenda setter, proposes a 
policy 𝜋B in the range 𝜋N	 ≤ 𝜋B ≤ 𝜋:∗   that makes B indifferent between averting and not averting 
the crisis, and B accepts (that policy also stands in period 2), whereas B, if agenda setter, proposes  






 (iv) If  𝜋:∗ < 𝜋N ≤ 𝜋:∗ + 𝛼, we also need to distinguish between several scenarios. Under power-
concentration institutions, the party in government adopts the policy 𝜋N if	ℎ ≥ ℎRS∗ , otherwise the 
party in government adopts its ideal policy 𝜋(∗; then the group that is in power in period 2 adopts 
its ideal policy. Under power-sharing institutions, the status quo policy 𝜋C remains in force in both 
period 1 and period 2 (and the crisis is not averted) if ℎ < ℎRX4∗ ; otherwise the agenda setter 
proposes  𝜋B = 𝜋N, and the government in period 2 adopts	𝜋4 = 𝜋:∗  (if A is agenda setter) or 𝜋4 =
2𝜋:∗ − 𝜋N  (if B is agenda setter). 
 (v) In the final scenario, 𝜋N > 𝜋:∗  + 𝛼. Under power-concentration institutions, the party in 
government adopts the policy 𝜋N if	ℎ ≥ ℎRS∗ , otherwise the party in government adopts its ideal 
policy 𝜋(∗; then the group that is in power in period 2 adopts its ideal policy. Under power-sharing 
institutions, the status quo policy 𝜋C remains in force in both period 1 and period 2 (and the crisis 
is not averted) if ℎ < ℎRXZ∗ = 	ℎRS,<∗ ; otherwise the agenda setter proposes  𝜋B = 𝜋N, and the 
government in period 2 adopts its ideal policy. 
 
 
